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At the beginning of June 2008, France’s Total, the last foreign energy company with 
operations in Iran, abandoned its drilling platform in South Pars gas field and left the 
country. Spain’s Repsol and Dutch Shell shut down operations earlier this spring, as EU 
ministers met in Brussels to deliberate a new round of sanctions that would target Iran’s 
massive oil and gas sectors. (1) The retreat of the multinational energy majors sapped 
Iran’s petroleum industry of capital, equipment and expertise, and left the most vital 
sector of the national economy devoid of foreign partnership. Straitened circumstances 
in Iran suited Russia’s Gazprom just fine.
            
The following week, in mid-June, Gazprom officials landed in Tehran prepared to step 
into the void left by the departing Western energy majors. There they took part in a 
signing ceremony to mark the conclusion of an agreement between Russia’s state-
controlled gas giant, Gazprom, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The 
resulting memorandum envisages a leading role for the Russians in Iran’s oil and gas 
industries, the future of which will be determined largely by the success or failure of a 
“full portfolio of projects,” described to the press corps by Iranian Oil Minister Gholam 
Hossein Nozari: exploitation of untapped gas fields, construction of new refineries, 
creation of a pipeline network to transport hydrocarbon volumes pumped from wells on 
the Caspian Sea and the Gulf of Oman… all choice projects and all conceived on a 
massive scale. (2) 
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On the Iranian side, negotiators seized upon the new partnership as an opportunity to 
push for delivery of Russian gas supplies to Iran’s energy-starved regions in the north, 
where industry lies idling beyond the reach of the national pipeline infrastructure that 
transports fuel drawn from rich petroleum fields in the south. NIOC offered to swap 
tankers loaded with Iranian oil in exchange for the Russian gas supplies. For Gazprom 
the proposal has attractions that lie far beyond the gas market in northern Iran: to the 
west, the Turkish border marks the start of a new corridor for Russian gas flowing to 
European markets, and to the east, a planned pipeline from Iran to India may one day 
provide Russia with an eastern route to carry its gas into Asian markets. Thus, for 
Gazprom, the deal with Iran is a plum.
For the West, the deal is a sign of the emerging partnership between Tehran and 
Moscow that is bedeviling the attempts of Western nations to force Iran into diplomatic 
quarantine until such a time as Tehran agrees to relinquish its quest for uranium 
enrichment. Western powers seem to have united around a general consensus that the 
most effective means of coercion available to the international community lies in 
weaving a web of sanctions to isolate this rogue state financially, diplomatically, and 
politically. (3) If Russia occasionally has lent its voice to the general consensus, it has 
not committed any actions to support it, as the recent energy deal attests. Instead of 
joining the West in isolating Iran, Russia has chosen an independent course aimed at 
balancing the imperative of preventing Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons with a 
parallel concern for keeping Iran as a strategic partner (if, indeed, this can be done).
Russia’s traditionally ambivalent strategy has some obvious advantages, including 
exclusive energy contracts for Gazprom. But, by advancing the development of Iran’s 
vital oil and gas sectors, Russia is, in effect, preventing the implementation of 
meaningful economic sanctions that represent the best non-violent option still available 
to the international community. Acting the part of a spoiler, Russia has demonstrated its 
willingness to compromise the international sanctions regime – a dangerous gambit that 
ratchets up the likelihood of a military show-down in response to the threat of a nuclear-
armed Iran.
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It is a gamble Russia appears willing to take, and in so doing, the country has shown 
itself to be an opportunist par excellence. As the sole foreign state willing to commit to 
Iran’s petroleum sector in the middle of a growing geopolitical crisis, Russia’s Gazprom 
has gained a foothold in a country, which is situated  above an estimated 136 billion 
barrels of oil and 974 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – the third largest reserves of 
petroleum in the world and the world’s second largest gas reserves, after Russia. (4) 
Confronted by such dazzling figures, the temptation is strong to throw one country’s 
billions into the pot together with the other’s trillions, and to entertain, be it ever so 
briefly, a scenario in which Gazprom joins its own vast hydrocarbon reserves with those 
of Iran.
But what is the real measure of Iran’s hydrocarbon potential for Russia? At present, 
Iran’s legendary oil and gas reserves remain just that—a legend—a mythical treasure 
sealed deep within the earth. Moreover, in spite of optimistic projections laid out in the 
memorandum of cooperation, Gazprom is not in a position to inject massive sums of 
capital into Iran’s oil and gas sectors, nor will it be in such a position so long as other 
priorities command its resources – financial and natural.
For over a decade, Russia’s energy giant has set its sights on European consumers 
and resisted even the lure of highly touted Asian markets in pursuit of a dominant 
position in Western downstream markets. (5) The company currently is embarking on a 
project that may be its most ambitious undertaking to date – the construction of two gas 
trunklines, one arcing down from the Baltic Sea into Germany, the other stretching west 
into Austria and south into Italy, in order ultimately to link Gazprom’s Russian gas fields 
directly to downstream markets in Europe. (See Map of Proposed Bosphorous Bypass 
Pipelines, page 10.)
Gazprom’s European campaign has given rise to a looming gas shortfall that threatens 
to undermine the company’s credibility as a reliable source for the continent’s natural 
gas supplies. According to the company’s own estimates, Gazprom’s ballooning 
commitments to foreign and domestic consumers will outstrip its rate of gas extraction 
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by 2012, leaving the company without spare gas volumes to supply Iran’s northern 
regions. (6) Nor does Gazprom have sufficient sums of hard capital to invest in the 
development of Iran’s oil and gas sectors at a time when the company is struggling to 
bring new Russian fields into production to replace mature fields in western Siberia, 
where output is already sliding into decline. In March, the company announced plans to 
invest $28.5 billion to support key projects within Russia in 2009, a number that 
represents a 40% increase over capital expenditures for 2008. (7) Along with the 
announcement came a pledge to cut back on all non-core expenditures. It remains to be 
seen whether Iran will be ranked among Gazprom’s core priorities, but at present it 
seems a remote possibility.
            
If Russia lacks the will and the means to develop Iran’s oil and gas sectors, what, then, 
is to be gained by sending the energy arm of the Russian state into Iran? Here it may be 
worth noting that Russia is pursuing parallel relations with countries such as Libya, 
Nigeria and Venezuela – as famous for their unsavory political regimes, as for their 
abundant hydrocarbon reserves. With each of those countries, as with Iran, Russia has 
used its oil and gas resources as a common base from which to establish bilateral 
relations. Should geopolitical developments warrant a strategic alliance, Russia can 
easily turn its commercial ties into concrete diplomatic ends. In current events, Russia 
reportedly is considering a plan to formalize its bilateral relationships with other natural 
gas exporters by bringing its energy partners into an international cartel similar to 
OPEC. Iran is said to have already given the cartel idea its wholehearted endorsement. 
(8)
Such an alliance is patently and latently anti-Western in its aims. The same may be said 
of Gazprom’s recent energy deal with NIOC, in which Russia issued a blunt rejection to 
the Western authors of the international sanctions regime. Russia might just as well 
have raised its Iranian energy contracts overhead like a semaphore to signal its open 
defiance of Western policies and powers. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to attribute 
Russia’s strategic partnership with Iran wholly to a callow will to rebel against a world 
order dominated by the West. The decision to deepen bilateral relations is at the center 
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of Russia’s independent approach to the Iranian nuclear problem, a policy that seeks to 
secure Russian national interests through political and diplomatic engagement with a 
rogue state. By cozying up to the black beast, Russia hopes to avoid its claws.
Such a policy clearly is not in keeping with the approach favored in the West, where 
priority is given to the establishment of a multilateral consensus and to the application of 
economic, diplomatic, and political pressures to isolate a rogue state. Yet, in the end it 
may prove to be an admirably functional policy by virtue of its exclusive application – as 
Iran’s only strategic partner, Russia has a relatively significant degree of influence with 
the government in Tehran and a correspondingly greater power to persuade through 
dialogue than Washington has, for example. The privileged relationship that Russia has 
been cultivating with Iran has not failed to elicit notice among world leaders, and it has 
even begun to yield strange fruit for Russia. One month after Gazprom was handed an 
exclusive energy deal by NIOC, Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, son of Crown 
Prince Sultan and former ambassador to Washington, flew into Moscow for a meeting 
with the Russian President and Prime Minister. The prince confessed to “a degree of 
discomfort” at the close ties between Russia and Iran, and, according to a report that 
appeared in the Russian press, he conveyed an offer to award Russia lucrative arms 
contracts if the Kremlin would agree to curtail its cooperation with Iran. (9) Russia could 
not hope for a more flattering tribute to its role as a newly burnished power broker in the 
Middle East.
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